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I. INTRODUCTION 
Low-level conflict contingencies are a relatively 
recent addition to the Australian defence lexicon. They 
appeared in various guises in public defence deliberations 
in the ~arly 1970s in the context of the quest for an 
alternative defence doctrine to 'forward defence', but their 
appearance also reflected changes in the public perception 
of potential threats to Australia's security. The perceived 
threat of communist or Asian expansionism receded, but for 
some observers was replaced by potential threats to 
Australian interests short of invasion or major assault. 
The 1976 White Paper on Australian Defence acknowledged 
the need for a defence force capability to deal with 
'selected shorter-term contingencies' ,rl} but formal 
recognition of the relevance of low-level contingencies to 
current defence doctrine was arguably conferred by the 
scenario for Exercise Kangaroo 83. Kangaroo 83 was a 
radical departure from its predecessors, which focussed on 
conventional war capabilities and employed the Australian 
armed forces in combined operations with their allied 
counterparts. The declared aim of Kangaroo 83 was 
to exercise the Australian Defence Force in joint 
operations in a low-level conflict in the defence 
of the north-west of Australia.r2} 
Kangaroo 83 broke new ground in terms of the nature, level 
and location of the exercise hostilities and the extent of 
joint operations between the Australian services~ it also 
involved civilian authorities and the local civilian 
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population on a scale without precedent in exercises of this 
nature. 
This study examines low-level conflict contingencies 
two contexts: 
. in 
(A) the incidence and nature of low-level conflict 
. 
since 1945 and its relevance to Australia's 
strategic environment~ and, 
(B) the role and perceptions of low-level conflict 
contingencies in Australian defence policy. 
These themes are examined in the following sequence: 
(A) Low-level conflict and Australia's 
strategic environment 
I Introduction. 
II A review of representative examples of low-level 
conflict since 1945. 
III A re-examination of Australia's strategic 
environment. 
IV An assessment of the relevance and applicability 
of low-level conflict contingencies to Australia. 
(B) Low-level contingencies and Australian 
defence policy 
V A brief survey of the evolution of Australian 
defence policy. 
VI An evaluation of the role of low-level conflict 
contingencies in Australian defence policy. 
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In summary, this study concludes that: 
(a) Low-level conflict contingencies are relevant to 
the assessment of Australia's strategic 
environment and the consequent formulation of 
defence policy and capabilities. 
(b) However assessments of low-level contingencies 
have to date tended to focus on the tactics that 
might be employed against Australia at the expense 
of their possible origins, the possible motives 
and objectives of the potential aggressor, and the 
political context in which such contingencies 
might arise. 
(c) In the absence of a specific threat, Australia's 
defence posture and the role of the Australian 
defence forces continue to lack definition. 
Low-level contingencies cannot themselves supply 
this focus and their invocation in the Australian 
defence debate does not diminish the need to 
adjust Australia's defence policy and capabilities 
to accommodate profound changes in our strategic 
environment. 
4 
NOTES 
1. Australian Parliament, Australian Defence (White 
Paper presented to Parliament by the Minister for 
Defence, the Hon. D.J. Killen, November 1976), 
Australian Government Publishing Service, 
Canberra, 1976, p.13. 
2. Department of Defence, Exercise Kangaroo 83: VIP 
Brief, p.l. 
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A: LOW-LEVEL CONFLICT AND AUSTRALIA'S STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT 
II. LOW-LEVEL CONFLICT SINCE 1945 
Introduction 
This ·section examines the nature of low-level conflict 
(including its relationship to other levels of conflict) and 
surveys a representative sample of such conflict since 1945. 
The implications of this analysis for Australian defence 
policy are examined below in section IV. 
Low-level conflict contingencies have also been 
described as 'lesser-', 'limited-', 'shorter-term-' or 'low 
intensity' contingencies; as 'contingent circumstances'; 
and as 'low-level situations'. In the interests of clarity 
and consistency this study presupposes the existence of a 
broad spectrum of conflict contingencies ranging from high-
to low-level and employs this terminology throughout. A 
high-level conflict contingency would threaten the survival 
or integrity of a state, while a low-level contingency would 
pose threats of lower magnitudes, e.g. threats or hostile 
actions designed to extract concessions in circumstances . in 
which national survival is not at stake. The utility of 
distinguishing intermediate or medium-level contingencies 
between these extremes will be adpressed below. 
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The Nature of Low-Level Conflict 
There appear to be four main areas in which low-level 
conflict might be distinguished from its higher-level 
counterpart: 
(i) the scale of the conflict; 
(ii) ·the character of the conflict; 
(iii) 
(iv) 
the objectives and strategies adopted by the 
initiator/aggressor; 
the objectives and counterstrategies adopted by 
the reactor / defender. 
All the above are subject to considerabl e variation both 
individually and in combination. 
In its 1981 report Threats to Australia's Security: 
Their Nature and Probability, the Joint Committee on Foreign 
Affairs and Defence (JCFAD) defined low-level contingencies 
as 
those threats which can be dealt with within the 
peacetime organisation and structure of the 
Defence Force.r1 J 
• 
The JCFAD report listed eleven low-level contingencies that 
might confront Australia: 
(a) sporadic attacks against key civil facilities and 
installations (which are sometimes referred to as 
vital points, as the orderly life of a modern 
society depends on them), for example, power 
stations, petroleum refineries, water supply 
pumping stations and computers; 
(b) attacks against isolated military facilities; 
(c) harassment of our shipping, fishing activities, 
and offshore exploration and exploitation; 
(d) sporadic intrusions into Australia's air space by 
military aircraft or smugglers; 
(e) military support for the illegal exploitation of 
our offshore resources; 
(f) the planned introduction of exotic diseases or the 
support of illegal migrants or drug-runners; 
(g) harassment of our nationals or a threat to their 
safety in overseas countries including seizure of 
overseas property and Australian embassies: 
(h) external support for dissident elements in, or 
military pressures against, a regional country the 
security of which is important to Australia: 
(i) covert or overt overseas support for Australian 
dissident or minority groups in Australia who 
might be encouraged to resort to terrorist action: 
(j) overseas based terrorist groups using violence or 
threats of violence in Australia or on an 
Austr·alian aircraft: and 
(k) large-scale but non-violent intrusions into 
Australia's proposed Exclusive Economic Zone for 
the purpose of poaching scarce resources. r 2 1 
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The JCFAD report also distinguished between low-level 
and intermediate-level contingencies, describing the latter 
as threats with 
The 
limited objectives (against Australia) 
policy limitations as to the extent 
destructive power that might be employed 
extent of the geographical areas that 
involved.r3J 
JCFAD identified five potential 
under 
of the 
and the 
might be 
intermediate 
contingencies and concluded that the defence effort required 
to respond to most of them 'would be likaely to involve a 
substantial expansion of the Australian Defence Force': 
(a) lodgements on Australian territory that are 
limited (including in time): the areas that 
appear to be more vulnerable as targets for 
limited lodgements would be offshore islands and 
territories as for example the Cocos Islands, or 
the Torres Strait Islands, or areas of northern 
and north-western Australia such as Cape York 
Peninsula, Arnhem Land, parts of the Kimberley or 
Pilbara regions and Australian territory in 
Antarctica: 
(b) major raids: targets for this level of threat are 
more likely to be military bases: key civil 
installations and facilities and the joint United 
States/Australian defence facilities. To be 
regarded as intermediate level threats, such raids 
would need to be on a continuing basis, or 
comprise seize-and-hold operations against major 
facilities or resource installations: 
(c) external aggression against a regional country, 
the security of which is highly important to 
11· 
( d) 
( e) 
Australia: this would apply particularly 
states and 
Indonesian/Melanesian 
Zealand: 
territories in 
archipelago and to 
to 
the 
New 
blockade of an Australian port or ports including 
by the relatively economical device of laying 
mines: and 
disruption of our lines of shipping 
communications, or closure of a strait either in 
isolation or in the context of Western lines of 
communications. As Australian trade is important 
to other powers and is mostly carried in foreign 
ships, it is difficult to envisage such a 
contingency occuring except as part of a more 
general conflict.r4 1 
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The range of low- and intermediate-level contingencies 
outlined above is broadly consistent with other public 
assessments of this nature,rsJ and conforms closely to an 
earlier presentation in a paper by Commodore K.D. Gray.r6 J 
Is this distinction between low- and intermediate-level 
contingencies justified? The spectrum of contingencies 
between high-level and low-level could in principle be 
subdivided into numerous divisions, but the utility of this 
exercise is questionable. Such definitions imply an 
orderly, stepped progression of escalating contingencies 
which belies their fluid nature. Further, such definitions 
tend to focus on the military or tactical aspects of the 
low-level contingencies at the expense of their political 
origins and manifestations. More importantly, the variables 
involved are such that most intermediate definitions would 
in practice break down. Low-level 'attacks against isolated 
military facilities' would not remain such if they occurre<l 
frequently or had a wide geographic distribution. Attacks 
of this nature might in practice prove more disruptive than 
Jr 
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the JCFAD's intermediate-level contingency of the impact on 
Australian trade of the closure of a strait. 
Should the defence effort required to counter a 
contingency be the sole or major criterion to distinguish 
between contingency levels? If so, the level of a 
contingency could be altered by changes in defence 
capabilities alone: a . given contingency could be 
intermediate-level pending the acquisition of a new weapons 
system, after which it could be downgraded to a low-level 
threat. The effort required to counter a conflict 
contingency is obviously an important factor in defence 
planning, but it seems too subjective and too variable to be 
as the . maJor criterion for defining relied upon 
contingencies. It tells us little about the possible 
origins or objectives of the contingency, and again tends to 
place contingencies in an exclusively military context. It 
will be argued below that the military dimension is only one 
of several dimensions in which low-level contingencies 
generally function. It therefore seems wiser to avoid the 
problems of definition encountered in any attempt to define 
a rigorous scale of conflict contingencies and to work 
within the two extremes, bearing in mind that the level of 
threat and consequent demands on defence resources obviously 
rise in the continuum between the lower and higher levels. 
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Low-level Conflict Since 1945 
Conflict can be categorised into 'almost endless 
typologies', but there appears to be a consensus on four 
basic types: nuclear war, conventional war, . minor 
harassment and insurgency.r71 In principle the latter three 
limited ·conventional war, minor harassment and insurgency 
can qualify as low-level conflict. But all four basic 
types of conflict can coalesce, and the divisions between 
the latter three in particular can become ambiguous and 
contentious.~8} 
A survey of low-level conflict since 1945 suggests that 
it can be separated into c6lonial conflict, interstate 
conflict, and internal conflict, although even these broad 
categories pose demarcation problems. A representative 
sample of low-level conflict since 1945 listed under these 
categories would include the following:r9! 
Colonial Conflict 
Indochina 1945-54 
French Morocco 1952-56 
Algeria 1945-49 
Indonesia 1945-49 
Kenya 1952-58 
Cyprus 1952-59 
West Irian 1962-63 
Interstate Conflict 
India-Pakistan (Kashmir) 1947-49 
Korea 1950-53 
India-China 1954-65 
Indonesia-Malaysia 1963-65 
United States-Cuba (Bay of Pigs) 1960-61 
Argentina-Chile (Beagle Channel) 1978-
China-Taiwan (Quemoy-Matsu Is.) 1954-58 
Britain-Iceland ('cod wars') 1958-61; 1972-73 
Argentina-Britain (Falkland/Malvinas Is.) 1982 
Internal Conflict 
Greece 1944-49 
Malaya 1948-60 
Vietnam 1955-75 
Cuba 1958-59 
Congo 1960-64 
Cyprus 1959-74 
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Some striking asymmetries of both power and perceptions 
in these · conflicts are immediately apparent. Most of the 
colonial conflicts were perceived as predominantly low-level 
conflicts by the defending colonial powers, but posited 
issues of national survival (or creation) for the opposing 
nationalists. The Korean and Vietnam conflicts were 
arguably high-level conflicts for the indigenous 
inhabitants, but not for their respective foreign allies. 
The governments in Beijing and Taipei would both view their 
conflict over the islands of Quemoy and Matsu as an 
extension of their prolonged internal conflict, yet to most 
external observers it met the criteria of conventional 
interstate conflict.r101 North Vietnam at least initially 
perceived its contest with South Vietnam as primarily an 
internal conflict, but the allies of South Vietnam 
interpreted it in interstate terms. Significantly none of 
the internal conflicts listed above was exclusively 
internal; the degree of foreign interference or 
intervention varied between cases and time . in over 
individual cases, but it was nevertheless a recurring 
I 
feature in these conflicts. 
11· 
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What do these examples of low-level conflict reveal 
about its nature and occurrence? A detailed case-by-case 
analysis is beyond the scope of this study, but the salient 
features of low-level conflict can be discerned in an 
examination of each category within the broad areas 
distinguished above of the scale and character of the 
conflict, the objectives and strategies adopted by the 
initiator/aggressor, 
counter strategies 
reactor/defender. 
and 
adopted 
Colonial Conflict 
the 
by or 
objectives 
imposed upon 
and 
the 
Colonial conflict may at first sight seem of marginal 
relevance to contemporary Australia, but it warrants 
examination for two reasons. First, colonial conflict has 
been a prominent arena of low-level conflict since 1945 and 
consequently merits scrutiny in any comprehensive study of 
the phenomenon. Secondly it will be argued that although it 
is inconceivable that Australia would again aspire to become 
a colonial power, the history of colonial conflict contains 
some potentially valuable experience which could be applied 
in Australian defence strategy. 
The scale of the colonial conflicts sampled varied 
considerably, but overall there was a recurring asymmetry of 
power between the opposing sides. As noted above, the level 
of conflict was generally perceived as relatively high 
within the disputed area but as relatively low from the 
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perspective of the colonial power. The notable exception 
was West Irian, where Indonesia employed an effective 
combination of belligerent diplomacy and low-level use of 
force to assert its claims against the Dutch commitment to 
self-determination for their West New Guinea subjects.r11J 
The s~ale of these conflicts can be partly discerned in 
force and casualty statistics. At the upper end of the 
scale, the casualties in the French forces during the 
Algerian conflict comprised 17,456 dead and almost 65,000 
wounded. (The French forces included more than 100,000 
Muslims.) European civilian casualties from some 42,000 acts 
it of terrorism amounted to about 10,000, of whom 3, 200 were 
killed or never accounted for. The French estimate that 
they killed 141,000 members of the opposing Front de la 
Liberation Nationale ( FLN), that another 12,000 died in 
internal fighting, that the FLN killed 16,000 Muslim 
civilians, and that another 50,000 Muslim civilians could 
never be traced. Estimates of the total numbers of Muslim 
Algerians killed during the conflict vary between from 
300,000 to one million.C121 
Towards the other end of the scale, the civilian 
casualties of the Mau Mau insurgency in Kenya amounted to 
1,826 Africans, 32 Europeans and 26 Asians killed, with 918 
Africans, 26 Europeans and 36 Asians wounded. Mau Mau 
casualties comprised 10,527 killed and 2,633 captured. It 
is recorded that 2,714 Mau Mau terrorists surrendered and 
that 26,625 were arrested: some 50,000 Mau Mau supporters 
1 · 
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were detained during the emergency. Security force 
casualties amounted to 534 Africans, 
Asians killed, with 465 Africans, 
Asians wounded.~13} 
63 Europeans and 3 
102 Europeans and 12 
The character of these colonial conflicts was in 
essence that of a nationalist struggle against an alien 
ruling power, and also reflected the asymmetry of power 
between the adversaries. The defending colonial forces were 
generally much better armed, equipped and trained, and 
usually possessed a marked advantage in overall numbers of 
combat troops. Their nationalist opponents compensated for 
their disadvantages by resorting to guerilla tactics, 
intimidation and subversion and by exploiting their contacts 
and support within the indigenous population. By selective 
employment of acts of terrorism against key personnel and 
facilities and avoiding armed clashes with superior colonial 
forces, relatively small numbers of nationalists were able 
to impose an enormous security burden on the colonial 
authorities. The nationalists' tactics were designed to 
apply pressures on the colonial authorities which would 
isolate them from their indigenous supporters and ultimately 
prove intolerable to their home electorate. 
These tactics met with considerable success against the 
colonial rule of war-weary, European liberal democracies, 
although it seems likely that considerably greater sacrifice 
would have been necessary to prevail against less liberal 
regimes. The tactics employed by the colonial powers 
15 
against the nationalist challenge were essentially defensive 
and reactive. Opportunities for taking the initiative were 
limited and generally involved operations designed to 
penetrate the opposing nationalist organisations and 
identify and neutralise their leaders, armed units and 
supporters_. These tactics frequently involved authoritarian 
and in some cases draconian measures, which were usually 
counterproductive insofar as they alienated support within 
the indigenous population and thereby strengthened the 
nationalist cause. 
The colonial conflicts were intensely political, 
embracing domestic and - with the notable exception of the 
Mau Mau insurgency in Kenya international elements.r14, 
The colonial powers and their nationalist opponents 
contested the 'hearts and minds' of the indigenous 
population, and this contest generally extended to the 
international political arena. The nationalists sought 
support in sympathetic countries and in international 
councils, and often manipulated their supporters and the 
media effectively in the colonial heartlands to take their 
case direct to 
constituency. 
their opponents' domestic political 
In general the colonial powers were on the 
defensive in the political contest as much as in the 
physical conflict, defending the status quo and reacting to 
their opponents' initiatives as the struggle developed. 
1::: 
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The immediate objective of the anti-colonial 
nationalists 
Post-colonial 
was to 
objectives 
displace 
varied 
the colonial power. 
between independence 
union with (Indochina, Morocco, Algeria and Indonesia), 
another country (Cyprus), and completion of . decolonisation 
(West Irian). The strategies employed to achieve these 
objectives were broadly consistent: to challenge the 
authority of the colonial power through political action: 
to mount selective physical attacks on individuals and 
facilities associated with the colonial government: to 
solicit or demand the support of the local population 
against the colonial power: to solicit international 
recognition and support to strengthen the pressures on the 
colonial power: and to cultivate support and/or defeatism 
within the colonial power. The political dimension of the 
struggle was a crucial element in each case since none of 
the anti-colonial movements could reasonably expect to 
prevail by force of arms alone. 
The basic objective of the colonial powers was to 
protect 
concerned. 
their position and interests in the colonies 
Their strategies varied considerably in time and 
place, but were again essentially reactive and defensive. 
The political dimension of the conflict and of the defensive 
strategies adopted by the colonial powers was readily 
apparent in both the domestic political debate and in 
international campaigns seeking understanding of or support 
for colonial policy. 
17 
Interstate Conflict 
The scale of interstate conflict appears wider and more 
varied than in the colonial conflicts. At one extreme the 
Korean War produced between three and four million 
casualties in a conflict that from the Korean perspective 
amounted to a full-scale conventional war waged throughout 
the peninsula. The casualties included approximately 30,000 
United States servicemen and 3,143 other United Nations 
servicemen killed, with 107,000 United States servicemen and 
15,700 other United Nations servicemen wounded or missing. 
Over 400,000 South Korean servicemen were killed, and a 
somewhat higher number were reported wounded or missing. 
South Korean civilian casualties are believed to have been 
about the same magnitude. North Korean casualties have been 
estimated at around 520,000, while Chinese casualties are 
thought to have amounted to about 900,000.r1s 1 It seems 
highly unlikely that a conflict of this magnitude on United 
States or Australian territory would be styled 'low-level', 
but the appellation appears to reflect an absence of 
strategic exchanges between the great powers involved as 
much as great power chauvinism or subjectivity. 
The British-Icelandic 'cod wars' of 1958-61 and 1972-73 
lie towards the opposite end of the interstate conflict 
scale. There appear to have been no serious casualties . in 
the physical encounters between British trawlers, Icelandic 
gunboats and Royal Navy frigates, which included ramming, 
18 
net-cutting and on at least one occasion the impact of an 
Icelandic shell on a British trawler.~16} 
The character of these conflicts and the tactics 
employed by the protagonists were as variable as their 
colonial counterparts. The Korean conflict amounted to a 
localised conventional war, and this pattern was repeated on 
a smaller scale in India's border conflicts with Pakistan 
and China, China's confrontation with Taiwan over the 
islands of Quemoy and Matsu and Britain's campaign against 
Argentina in the Falkland/Ma lvinas Islands. 
Indonesia employed infiltration and insurgency against 
Malaysia during its Confrontation campaign, which was 
largely confined to small-scale raids designed to incite 
rebellion or communal conflict. The raids never amounted to 
a significant security threat and casualties on both sides 
were light, but insurgent tactics again necessitated an 
expensive and disproportionate level of response by the 
defending forces. In Cuba the rebellion against the 
government of Fidel Castro forecast by the CIA and by Cuban 
emigres did not materialise and the insurgents were defeated 
ignominiously by Cuban security forces. 
The conflict between Argentina and Chile over disputed 
claims to three small and uninhabited islands in the Beagle 
Channel is an incipient one, which in 1978 (as in 1899 and 
1902) appeared to bring the two countries to the brink of 
war. The Vatican is mediating in the dispute, to date with 
little success.rl7! 
ll 
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The opponents' objectives . in this sampling of 
interstate conflict were rather more varied and complex than 
in the colonial conflicts reviewed above. It is generally 
rather more difficult to identify the initiator/aggressor: 
most of the interstate conficts have a complex history and 
the identification of the initiator often reflects 
political, legal or moral judgements. The . . origins of the 
conflict between Pakistan and India over Kashmir lie in 
centuries of Hindu-Muslim conflict in the region, the trauma 
of Partition, and Pakistan's sympathies for a predominantly 
Muslim neighbouring state under Hindu rule. Both Pakistan 
and India moved regular troops into Kashmir when communal 
strife broke out in 1947, and the 1949 ceasefire line which 
subsequently conceded approximately 5,000 square miles of 
western Kashmir to Pakistan (and left India with the 
remaining 81,000 square miles) became a de facto 
international frontier.~18] Pakistan's claims are arguably 
buttressed by India's continuing refusal to allow an act of 
self-determination to be held in Kashmir. Both parties 
blame the other for the conflict, and in such circumstances 
it remains a difficult and probably futile exercise to try 
to identify a single initiator/aggressor. 
India's border conflicts with China have similar 
antecedents, arising from nineteenth and early twentieth 
century border demarcations at the initiative of the British 
Raj. China claimed that it never accepted British 
demarcation in the disputed areas, while India stood firm on 
its inherited British-drawn frontiers. China expressed a 
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willingness to negotiate on the basis of the status quo, but 
from 1954 border incidents occurred as both sides began to 
assert their presence in the disputed territory. The border 
incidents were not made public and relations appeared calm 
until in 1959 Indian public opinion and comment in support 
of an upsuccessful revolt in Tibet led to a marked 
deterioration in relations. Prime Minister Nehru disclosed 
the history of Chinese border 'intrusions' and Indian public 
opinion against China hardened. India adopted an aggressive 
forward patrol policy in the disputed areas apparently on 
the assumption that China ·would back down because of Soviet 
Union and Western support for India. China initially 
responded cautiously, but Indian policy became progressively 
more assertive in response to domestic and international 
pressures. In October 1962 Chinese forces took the 
initiative and in a brief campaign asserted their control in 
the disputed border areas of primary concern to China.rl9} 
Britain's 
Falkland/Malvinas 
conflict 
Islands 
with Argentina over 
also had its origins 
the 
. 1n a 
territorial dispute, in this case dating from 1765 when 
Commodore John Byron took possession of the islands in the 
name of King George III.r20J In 1982 Argentina invaded the 
islands, but this decision owed much to misperceptions of 
and miscalculations about British intentions. Britain 
contributed significantly to these misperceptions, and 
domestic political considerations and pressures in both 
countries played a significant role in the evolution of this 
conflict.r21~ 
... 
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The primary objective in the interstate conflicts 
between India and Pakistan, India and China, Britain and 
:Ji Argentina was the acquisition or retention of disputed 
territory. Domestic and international political factors 
affected the evolution of each conflict, but they were 
principally territorial disputes. However in the Korean War 
and the conflicts between Indonesia and Malaysia and the 
United States and Cuba, the objectives were primarily 
political. The Korean War arose from rival claims of 
sovereignty after the Soviet Union blocked United Nations 
proposals for elections throughout Korea to establish a 
unified state, but rapidly acquired a Cold War character as 
the allies of the opposing states intervened in support of 
their respective proteges. Indonesia's campaign of 
'Confrontation' against the creation of Malaysia arose from 
opposition to what was perceived as an artificial 
nee-colonialist entity, but domestic political factors 
influenced its course.C22: The United States sponsored the 
Bay of Pigs landings by Cuban dissidents in the hope and 
expectation that they would precipitate a widespread 
rebellion that would depose a hostile neighbouring 
government. 
As noted above, the confrontation between China and 
Taiwan over the islands of Quemoy and Matsu was in essence a 
continuation of the Chinese civil war. Its immediate 
origins can be traced to aggressive raids on the mainland 
launched by the Nationalists from these inshore islands 
although, as in the Korean War, the conflict quickly 
acquired Cold War dimensions. 
A 
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The objectives of Chile and Argentina in their dispute 
over the Beagle Channel islands are ostensibly territorial, 
but political and other objectives are also evident. When 
conflict seemed imminent in 1978 both countries were ruled 
by military governments, and it has been suggested that an 
international cause celebre of this nature had attractions 
as a buttress to their domestic authority. However the 
central issue appears to be that Chile's possession of the 
islands offers prospects of access to rich fishing grounds 
and potential offshore oil fields through a territorial sea 
projection from the mouth of the Beagle Channel. Argentina 
contests Chile's claims as a violation of their 1881 
agreement on their spheres of influence, and also seeks to 
end Chilean control of both approaches to its most southerly 
naval base at Ushuaia. The contest for these islands may 
also be perceived by both parties as an initial trial of 
strength affecting their competing claims in Antarctica.r23l 
Britain's 'cod wars' with Iceland arose from competing 
objectives and claims concerning sovereignty, on this 
occasion sovereignty over maritime resources rather than 
territory. Once again the historical antecedents of the 
conflict had important implications for both parties. 
British vessels had fished Icelandic fishing grounds since 
1400 AD, and conflict occurred following Iceland's 
unilateral extension of its fishing zone to twelve miles in 
1958 and to fifty miles in 1972. (Iceland claimed a 200 
mile fishing zone in 1975 and a revised fishing agreement 
with Britain was concluded . in 1976.) British fishermen 
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claimed long-established rights to the fishing grounds 
closed unilaterally by Iceland, while Iceland justified the 
extension of its fishing zone on the contention that 
overfishing by foreign fleets threatened its most vital 
natural resource. These opposing objectives regarding 
sovereignty over maritime resources begat other objectives 
and responses, including domestic political objectives in 
Britain and Iceland, strains upon NATO and EEC unity, and 
changes in Iceland's relations with the Soviet Union.~24 ~ 
The 1 cod wars 1 arose from a dispute over access to 
resources, but their economic . . or1.g1.ns reached to the 
fifteenth century and their political environment embraced 
domestic politics in the countries directly concerned, 
alliance politics within NATO and relations between the 
Soviet Union and a strategic member of the NATO alliance. 
Internal Conflict 
Perceptions of the sample of internal conflicts listed 
above tend to reflect at least some measure of ideological 
orientation. The internal conflicts in Greece (1944-49), 
Malaya (1948-60), Vietnam (1955-75) and Cuba (1958-59) were 
predominantly a drive for power by indigenous communist 
parties with varying degrees of external support, and can be 
variously interpreted as manifestations of the Cold War or 
as indigenous power struggles. The conflict in the Congo 
(1960-64) was predominantly tribally-based, notwithstanding 
the radical inclinations and reputation of the murdered 
A 
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Prime Minister, Patrice Lumumba. The civil conflict . in 
Cyprus was also a tribal conflict, although the term 
'communal' is favoured outside the African continent. The 
defeat of the communist insurgency in Malaya was to a great 
extent due to its identification with the Chinese community 
and consequent lack of appeal to the predominantly Malay 
population. 
The scale and nature of these internal conflicts varied 
within and between them, and embraced conflict ranging from 
political action through insurgency to conventional war. 
All of them constituted a struggle for power between 
opposing groups, and the political elements of the struggle 
remained important to both sides. All of the protaganists -
governments and opponents sought and received varying 
degrees of external support and assistance. This ranged 
from the very limited external support received by the 
Communist Party of Malaya r2sJ to the massive external 
assistance given to both sides in the Vietnam War. 
Stripped of the accompanying rhetoric, the primary 
objective of the opposing groups/tribes/classes was to 
obtain or retain power within the state concerned. 
Vietnam fought to reunite a divided country, 
North 
and the 
Katangese secessionists from the Congo sought to create 
their own state. The Greek and Cuban conflicts appear to be 
the only ones readily susceptible to Marxist analysis: the 
Malayan insurgency was communally-based: the Vietnam War 
constituted a reassertion of (North) Vietnamese hegemony 
""""'I 
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over South Vietnam and Indochina~ the Congo and Cyprus 
religious/cultural) conflicts were based on tribal 
differences. 
A Profile of Low-Level Conflict 
(i.e. 
What does this survey reveal about the nature of 
low-level conflict apart from a marked resistance to 
classification? 
Perhaps the most striking general attribute of 
low-level conflict is the variety manifested in the 
conflicts themselves and in perceptions of these conflicts. 
The asymmetries of power that often occur in low-level 
conflicts seem dwarfed by the recurring asymmetries of 
perception of the conflict by the protagonists, by their 
allies and supporters, and within international society at 
large. These asymmetries of perception are such that any 
assessment of low-level conflict is immediately vulnerable 
to criticism or interpretation in ideological or political 
terms. 
The scale of low-level conflict can vary between 
relatively wide extremes, ranging from localised 
conventional war to minor harassment. The sample of 
low-level conflict reviewed above suggests that in general 
the number of combatants and their missions tend to be 
limited in area and time, and the overall military effort 
tends to fall short of full-scale mobilisation for one if 
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not both protagonists. The scale of low-level conflict 
seems to be a consequence of two main factors: the relative 
importance (or lack of importance) of the interests at stake 
and the relative power of the adversaries. The inhibitions 
to the escalation of low-level conflict warrant closer 
examination than this study can afford, but the reasons why 
low-level 
addressed. 
conflicts tend to remain thus need to be 
In brief, the main restraints appear to be that 
the protagonists with the will or incentive to escalate the 
conflict lack the power to do so (e.g. nationalists 
fighting a colonial power), while those possessing the power 
to escalate the conflict lack the will or incentive, usually 
because the interests at stake do not warrant the effort or 
the risks involved in escalation. The political dimension 
thus seems an important inhibiting factor in low-level 
conflict: if the conflicts surveyed above had been confined 
to straightforward military contests, their nature and 
course could arguably have been very different. 
The character and tactics of low-level conflict are as 
variable as the scale of the conflict. Nevertheless a 
recurring feature of the character of these conflicts . lS 
their intensely political nature. If 'war is nothing but a 
continuation of political intercourse, with a mixture of 
other means' ,r26, then the mixture which produces low-level 
conflict has a proportionately stronger concentration of 
politics than 'other means' . The political nature of 
low-level conflict in part reflects the frequent asymmetries 
between the adversaries' capabilities and power: in most 
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cases the initiator/aggressor is either unwilling or unable 
to rely on 'other means' alone. But the political character 
of low-level conflict is also shaped by the fact that the 
protagonists are usually motivated qy strong political 
aspirations or objectives; low-level conflict can often be 
interpreted as a relatively straightforward contest for 
power or resources, but its origins, evolution and internal 
dynamics are almost invariably complex and composed of 
diverse political elements. 
Another recurring feature of low-level 
their relatively confined geographical focus. 
conflicts is 
The internal 
conflicts reviewed above were almost entirely confined to 
the country concerned, although other (usually neighbouring) 
countries in some cases provided support or sanctuary for 
the initiator/aggressor group. The colonial conflicts were 
largely confined to the colonies concerned. The interstate 
conflicts sampled were also limited in their geographical 
extent, usually being confined to the area that constituted 
the focus of the dispute. The interstate conflicts 
generally involved neighbouring states, half of which were 
contiguous neighbours. The notable exc.eption to this 
pattern was the conflict between Argentina and Britain over 
the Falkland/Malvinas Islands. 
The objectives 
initiator/aggressor 
and strategies adopted by the 
and the reactor/defender were also very 
variable, 
opposition. 
the only common element being their mutual 
In the colonial and internal conflicts sampled 
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the objectives of the initiator/aggressor were mainly 
political and the conflict strategies employed were 
fashioned to serve political ends. Interstate conflicts 
were generally more complex. Some had primarily political 
objectives 
States-Cub?) 
resources 
(Korea, 
while 
disputes 
Indonesia-Malaysia, and United 
others focussed on territorial or 
(India-Pakistan, India-China, 
Argentina-Chile, 
Argentina-Britain). 
China-Taiwan, Britain-Iceland, and 
The territorial/resources disputes were 
notable for their historical antecedents, which all 
incorporated strong political elements. With the exception 
of the more recent China-Taiwan conflict, all these disputes 
had origins in the nineteenth or earlier centuries. 
Economic and resources considerations surfaced in many 
of the above conflicts, but these issues were only prominent 
in the Britain-Iceland and Argentina-Chile disputes. In the 
latter confrontation these considerations have not eclipsed 
the political dimension of the dispute. 
The influence of leaders and interest groups in the 
evolution and conduct of low-level conflict is beyond the 
scope of this study, but their influence in defining 
objectives, mobilising political 
strategy should not be underestimated. 
support and setting 
It is difficult to 
imagine the course of Indonesia's Confrontation of Malaysia 
without President Sukarno, for example. Sukarno's influence 
at this period may have been the result of a confluence of 
factors outside his control, but he exercised it . .1.n an 
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idiosyncratic manner which placed his personal imprint 
indelibly upon the policy and which ironically facilitated 
its dismantling once the political architect was removed 
from power. 
Conclusion 
The relevance of this experience of low-level conflict 
to contemporary Australia will be considered in detail in 
section IV below, but in brief the historical record 
suggests 
substantial 
that 
and 
probable prerequisites could include 
relatively longstanding political 
differences with a colonial possession, neighbouring state 
or between opposing internal groups, and/or a dispute with 
another state over territory or resources. These potential 
sources of conflict would interact within a complex balance 
of interests or asymmetry of power which would inhibit the 
escalation of low-level conflict to higher levels. 
The historical record of low-level conflict since 1945 
. 
is illuminating but several qualifications should be 
entered. History does not necessarily repeat itself, and 
the already variable nature of low-level conflict may change 
in response to changed political aspirations or ideologies 
and to changes in technology. Further, Australia's 
political and strategic situation . is . in some respects 
. 
unique: it should not be assumed that the lessons of 
history learned in other regions necessarily apply to 
Australia. 
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III. AUSTRALIA'S STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT 
This section offers a brief exposition of Australia's 
strategic environment and attempts to highlight aspects that 
the preceding analysis suggests might be vulnerable to 
low-level conflict contingencies. The evolution of 
Australiarr defence perceptions and policy and the influence 
of this legacy on contemporary perceptions and policy is 
explored below in section v. 
A Profile of Australia 
Australia is an island continent situated between 
latitudes 10 and 44 degrees south and longitudes 113 and 154 
degrees east. It has an area of 7.68 million square 
kilometres and a coastline of 36,735 kilometres. Australia 
claims a 200 nautical mile fishing zone which places a 
similar area under Australian jurisdiction and overlaps 
comparable claims by its 
neighbours. 
northern and north-eastern 
Australia's nearest neighbours are Indonesia and Papua 
New Guinea; Timar is 455 kilometres north-west of Cape 
Bougainville and the coast of Papua is 155 kilometres north 
of Cape York. Australia claims a number of offshore and 
island territories, the latter including Heard and McDonald 
Islands, Christmas Island, Cocos Island and Norfolk Island. 
Australia claims sovereignty over its Antarctic Territory 
which could also in principle form the basis of related 
maritime claims. 
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Australia's climate reflects its size and location. 
Thirty-nine per cent~l} of Australia lies within the 
tropical zone, but 29.6 per cent has a median annual 
rainfall of less than 200 millimetres. A further 22.9 per 
cent of Australian territory lies in the 200 to 300 
millimetre median rainfall range, placing a total of 52.5 
per cent of Australia within a median rainfall range of 300 
millimetres or less. 
Australia's population in 1982 was 15 million. In 1980 
the combined population of New South Wales and Victoria 
amounted to 9.0 million of the then population of 14.6 
million, and the populations of the state capitals and 
adjacent urban districts with populations above 100,000 
together amounted to 10.2 million. This constituted 69.7 
per cent of the then total population. 
Australia has a mixed economy with a productive rural 
sector and substantial mineral resources. In 1980-81 
foodstuffs, metalliferous ores and mineral fuels together 
amounted to $11,925 million of Australia's total merchandise 
exports of $18,941 million. Imports under the same 
categories amounted to $3,418 million, of which $2,726 
million were in the mineral fuels category. The industrial 
sector is under pressure from cheaper imports and is 
somewhat precariously based on a small domestic market and 
relatively high wage costs: in 1980-81, for example, 
Australia's exports of machinery and transport equipment 
valued at $1,078 million were swamped by imports in the same 
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category of $7,033 million. The most productive areas of 
the rural sector are concentrated in the eastern and 
south-eastern arcs of the continent, but substantial mineral 
and mineral fuel resources are located in remote areas along 
the western and north-western arcs. 
Australia's strategic environment thus contains some 
notable vulnerabilities in terms of low-level conflict (e.g. 
population size, density and distribution, dispersed 
resources, dependence on imported technology) which are 
offset by some countervailing assets (e.g. relatively long 
sea approaches, 
self-sufficiency . in 
no contiguous 
foodstuffs 
neighbours, relative 
and some other key 
resources). The arid environment of most of the continent 
contributes significantly to the strategic isolation of 
Australia's productive eastern and southern regions. It 
probably also ensures that the military effort required to 
threaten or harass these Australian 'heartlands' would in 
practice constitute more than low-level conflict - at least 
from the Australian perspective. 
.. 
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Australia's Alliances 
The ANZUS Treaty 
The 1976 Parliamentary White Paper on Australian 
Defence observed that the 1951 ANZUS Treaty between 
Australia, · New Zealand and the United States was our 'one 
significant alliance ', with the proviso that 'it is prudent 
to remind ourselves that the US has many diverse interests 
and obligations' .r21 The key elements of the ANZUS Treaty 
are set out in Articles III and IV: 
Article III 
The Parties will consult together whenever in the 
opinion of any of them the territorial integrity, 
political independence or security of any of the 
Parties is threatened in the Pacific. 
Article IV 
Each Party recognises that an armed attack in the 
Pacific Area on any of the Parties would be 
dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares 
that it would act to meet the common danger in 
accordance with its constitutional processes.~31 
The 'Nixon Doctrine' announced by President Nixon in Guam in 
July 1969 and elaborated . in a message to Congress . in 
February 1970 decreed that the allies and partners of the 
United States must accept primary responsibility for their 
own defence, although the United States undertook to provide 
a nuclear shield for those allies or other nations whose 
independence was considered vital to the United States.r4] 
The exposition of the 'Nixon Doctrine' amplified rather 
than qualified the ANZUS Treaty. The only unambiguous 
obligation imposed on the ANZUS partners is to consult, and 
the 'Nixon Doctrine' merely confirmed that any subsequent 
Ji 
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action by the United States in support of a treaty partner 
would depend on the prevailing situation and its 
implications for United States interests. This position is 
both rationa1 and reasonable given the 'many diverse 
interests and obligations' of a superpower, and it would be 
naive to expect less qualified assurances or more explicit 
guarantees. The ANZUS Treaty could in principle have been 
invoked by Australia or New Zealand to counter low-level 
conflict contingencies prior to the exposition of the 'Nixon 
Doctrine', but its genesis and orientation were even then 
based on higher-level contingencies.~51 
The ANZUS Treaty remains a key element in Australian 
defence strategy, but its nature and provisions make it 
unlikely either that the relationship itself might involve 
Australia in low-level conflict in the foreseeable future, 
or that it would deliver direct United States intervention 
should Australia be drawn into a low-level conflict. 
Nevertheless the treaty could act as a deterrent and inhibit 
an aggressor from escalating a campaign of low-level 
conflict against Australia to higher magnitudes of conflict. 
It also provides the basis for a close defence relationship 
which in most circumstances would ensure that Australia 
received a high priority in the delivery of United States 
defence materiel and logistical and other support to counter 
any externally directed campaign of low-level conflict. 
jd 
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The Manila Treaty 
The South-east Asia Collective Defence Treaty signed in 
Manila in 1954 was framed in comparable terms. It also 
imposes an obligation to consult in the event of any 
perceived threat and avoids specifying what if any action a 
treaty partner might take beyond that it act 'in accordance 
with its constitutional processes. 1 r6, 
The Manila Treaty sought to contain perceived security 
threats from China and Indochina. The original treaty 
partners comprised Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, 
the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom and the United 
States. The South East Asia Treaty Organisation was formed 
on the basis of the Manila Treaty, but its members never 
achieved the level of unity or commitment of its North 
Atlantic counterpart. 
'east of Suez' in 1968: 
enunciated in 1969. 
Britain commenced its withdrawal 
the 'Nixon Doctrine' was first 
Pakistan formally withdrew in 1973, 
followed by France in 1974. In 1975 the remaining treaty 
partners resolved to 'phase out' the organisation because of 
changed conditions in the region. The Manila Treaty is thus 
moribund, and it is difficult to conceive of circumstances 
in which it might be invoked by Australia or in which its 
invocation by others might produce substantial military 
assistance from Australia. 
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The Five Power Defence Arrangements 
The Five Power Defence Arrangements(FPDA) concluded . in 
1971 cover defence cooperation between Australia, Malaysia, 
New Zealand, Singapore and the United Kingdom. The 
arrangements are not a formal treaty but a Ministerial 
declaration and an exchange of documents to implement it. 
The arrangements were concluded in response to Britain's 
military withdrawal from Asia, and they provide a useful 
(but not essential) framework for delivering defence 
assistance to Malaysia and Singapore. However the only 
unambiguous obligation undertaken by the participants is 
again that of consultation: in the event of an external 
attack or threat of such attack on Malaysia or Singapore 
rthe partiesl would immediately consult together 
for the purpose of deciding what measures should 
be taken jointly or separately in relation to such 
attack or threat.r7J 
The FPDA were designed to enhance the security of 
Malaysia and Singapore and to assist them develop their own 
defence capabilities. It is all but inconceivable that 
Australia would invoke these arrangements in the defence of 
its own interests, although it seems quite probable that 
Malaysia and Singapore would seek Australian assistance 
under the terms of the FPDA in the event of an external 
attack or threat of external attack of any magnitude. 
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International Disputes 
Australia has no territorial or related disputes with 
other states. The delimitation of some maritime and seabed 
boundaries with Indonesia, the Solomon Islands and New 
Zealand is still subject to negotiation. A number of 
overlappin~ claims with Indonesia require resolution, but 
the negotiation of maritime boundaries with the Solomon 
Islands and 
difficulties. 
New Zealand seems unlikely to raise 
The prospects that issues of t his nature 
could develop into sources of conflict are reviewed below in 
section IV. 
The Global Strategic Environment 
Australia is isolated from the principal areas of 
global tension and conflict, and in particular lies well 
clear of the likely primary nuclear target areas of the 
superpowers. Opinions vary about the immediate and 
long-term effects of a nuclear exchange in the northern 
hemisphere: the effects of a nuclear war largely confined 
to the northern hemisphere on southern latitudes are even 
more speculative. However assuming a northern hemisphere 
nuclear exchange does not disrupt the equatorial trough of 
low pressure which separates most of the atmospheric 
circulation between the hemispheres, the effects of this 
catastrophe 
latitudes. 
could be diluted significantly . 1n southern 
One possible post-World War III scenario could 
therefore be that it might not rend the economic, social and 
j 
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political fabric of Australia and its neighbours on a scale 
comparable to the devastation of many if not most northern 
hemisphere states, and that the South East Asian and South 
Pacific survivors would have to adjust inter alia to a new 
regional strategic environment without effective external 
allies. The strategic implications for tropical and 
southern latitudes of a global nuclear war largely confined 
to the northern hemisphere have tended to be neglected by 
strategists and nuclear scenario-writers who have 
understandably tended to focus on its impact on its northern 
hemisphere· protagonists. 
But even if Australia were spared the worst effects of 
a northern hemisphere nuclear exchange, it contains three 
United States installations which are probable nuclear 
targets. These 
and Nurrungar 
installations - North West Cape, Pine Gap 
make significant contributions to the 
command, control, communications, navigation and 
intelligence capabilities of 
arsenal, and hence to 
the United States strategic 
its nuclear war-fighting 
capabilities.~8] Soviet targeting doctrine accords a 
relatively high priority to these capabilities, and it can 
be assumed that they are targeted. However the relative 
accuracy of Soviet strategic weapons and the remoteness of 
the installations from major population centres suggests 
that collateral casualties and damage could be minimised by 
relatively economical civil defence measures. Australia 
hosts no other fixed potential strategic targets of this 
magnitude, although mobile elements of the United States 
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strategic forces would also appear on Soviet target lists 
and would therefore pose a potential threat to their 
environs while in Australian territory during a general 
nuclear war. 
The concentration of Australia's population and 
industrial· capacity in coastal agglomerations renders them 
vulnerable to strategic nuclear attack and to conventional 
attack from a variety of platforms (e.g. stand-off guided 
weapons launched from ships, submarines or long-range 
bombers). However none of these centres seem to possess 
significant strategic importance to warrant a nuclear 
targeting priority, and the only plausible scenario for a 
sustained conventional attack would be as a prelude to 
invasion. There is a broad consensus that at present only 
the superpowers have the capability to mount a credible 
invasion threat, which would involve the commitment of a 
substantial proportion of their forces.r9! It is generally 
taken for granted that the United States does not pose an 
invasion threat, and that it would not stand idle if its 
superpower rival contemplated an invasion of Australia. But 
given the Soviet Union's existing commitments and strategic 
priorities, it . 15 in any event difficult to conceive the 
circumstances in which the potential gains might warrant the 
immense risks and effort that would be required to establish 
a Soviet beachhead on Australian territory. 
l 
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The Regional Strategic Environment 
Australia maintains relatively close and amicable 
relations with its ASEAN and Pacific neighbours and 
generally shares their regional objectives and perceptions. 
Australia's relations with Vietnam are more formal and 
rather less substantial but appear broadly satisfactory to 
both. 
Annex A presents a statistical profile of Australia's 
regional strategic environment. The population and economic 
growth rates are particularly striking. The present 
combined population of the ASEAN countries is 270 million: 
medium variant projections estimate that this figure will 
reach 368 million in the year 2000 and 458 milion in 2020. 
The Indochina countries at present have a population of some 
67 million. In the year 2000 their projected population 
will be 95 million and will increase to 122 million in 2020. 
The ASEAN countries sustained average GNP growth rates of 
between 7 and 18 per cent during the 1970s, and the present 
contribution of industry to their GNP . l.S already 
significant, ranging from 20 to 41 per cent of GNP. The 
current combined strength of the ASEAN armed forces 1.s 
compared with 1,097,700 men under arms . in 759,200, 
Indochina. The present strength of Vietnam's armed forces 
is 1,029,000. 
The expected increase in regional population will be 
accompanied by profound changes in the urban-rural balance. 
In 1980, the urban population of South East Asia (the ASEAN 
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countries, Burma and Indochina) comprised 22.8 per cent of 
the total population. This proportion is projected to 
increase to 34.6 per cent in 2000 and to 50.1 per cent in 
2020. Indonesia's urban population in 1980 amounted to 20.2 
per cent of the total population. In the year 2000 this 
proportion is projected to increase to 32.3 per cent, and to 
reach 48.1 per cent in 2020.r10} 
Australia's regional environment is thus a dynamic one, 
with high population and economic growth rates generating 
profound changes in traditional societies. There are many 
other variables involved, and the implications of these 
trends for Australia are difficult to forecast. It . lS 
noteworthy that in general the region is evolving as a 
pluralistic collection of states each commanding substantial 
resources of its own. There are no signs of a single state 
or centre of power emerging which might seek or achieve a 
position of dominance within the region. It can also be 
argued that the population and economic growth rates of 
Australia's neighbours do not in· themselves threaten 
important Australian interests but rather offer potentially 
valuable economic opportunities for Australia.r11 l The 
future evolution of Australia's regional environment remains 
somewhat obscure and contains many variables. It would be 
naive to assume that its progress will either benefit or 
bypass Australia's interests, but it should also be 
acknowledged that at present our regional environment . lS 
rather more benign than that of the majority of our allies 
and friends in the northern hemisphere. 
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Nations, New York, 1982 1 pp.212, 280. ~ 
The pressure of overseas competition on Australian 
industry is not primarily of regional origin. 
I:· 
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IV. LOW-LEVEL CONFLICT CONTINGENCIES AND AUSTRALIA 
This section assesses the relevance and applicability 
of low-level contingencies to Australia's strategic 
environment. 
Colonial Conflict and Australia 
Australia is no longer a colonial power, and the 
prospect of low-level conflict arising as some form of 
indigenous national struggle against Australian sovereignty 
is all but inconceivable. 
Indonesia's campaign of Confrontation against Malaysia 
is categorised in this study as interstate conflict, but it 
should be remembered that its inspiration was 
anticolonialism. The possible application of a campaign of 
this nature against Australia is considered below as a 
variant of interstate conflict. 
However colonial conflict could provide the basis for a 
potent defence strategy designed to deter threats of 
invasion and occupation of all or part of Australia. Should 
such threats materialise, colonial conflict could provide a 
strategy for continuing resistance, although it must be 
recognised that a colonial conflict strategy would not be as 
effective against an occupying power untroubled by domestic 
or international opinion or by human rights considerations 
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as it was against the European liberal democracies after 
World War I I. Nevertheless the lessons of colonial conflict 
could be applied as strategies and tactics of last resort, 
and at the very least a demonstrated preparedness to use 
them would raise the deterrence threshold. 
The ·effectiveness of this strategy can be discerned . in 
Japanese deliberations in 1942 on the question of an 
invasion of Australia. One of the reasons the Army General 
Staff recommended against invasion was that 'the 
Australians, in view of their national character, would 
resist to the end' .r1~ The Army General Staff were probably 
correct, although knowledge of the reactions of unprepared 
civilians to Japanese attacks on Darwin might have tempered 
their advice somewhat. One wonders, however, whether 
resistance of a similar magnitude could be predicted with as 
much confidence for contemporary Australia. At the very 
least, considerable advance preparation would be required 
before a willingness to resort to colonial conflict 
strategies would be viewed as a credible deterrent. 
A further lesson Australia might adapt from the 
experience of colonial conflict is exploitation of the 
political elements of the contest. These would be 
particularly important if an aggressor was dependent on 
material and political support from third countries: an 
effective international political campaign could weaken this 
external support, consolidate and expand support from 
Australia's allies, and - if the prevailing global political 
! 
p 
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winds were favourable enable Australia to neutralise 
low-level conflict hostilities by raising the spectre of 
wider and higher-level conflict which neither superpower 
would tolerate. The circumstances of such a political 
campaign would be far removed from colonial conflict, but 
many of the underlying principles of asymmetric colonial 
conflict could still apply. 
Interstate Conflict and Australia 
As noted above, the scale, character, objectives and 
strategies of low-level interstate conflict are extremely 
variable. In applying the patterns of interstate conflict 
identified above to Australia's strategic environment two 
elements need to be addressed: motivation and capability. 
The former embraces the potential origins of conflict and 
the possible objectives of the initiator/aggressor, which 
are assessed below under the interrelated themes of 
historical enmity, politics and tribalism, territorial 
disputes, Antarctica, and resources disputes. The 
capabilities required to mount a campaign of low-level 
interstate conflict against Australia are examined 
separately. 
Historical Enmity 
Australia has no tradition of enmity against any state 
and enjoys generally amicable relations with its neighbours. 
Australia and New Zealand are culturally distinct from their 
:Ji 
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predominantly Malay neighbours in South East Asia and their 
predominantly Melanesian neighbours · in the South West 
Pacific, but these differences have not to date been a 
source of enmity or conflict. 
Politics and Tribalism 
We have seen that politics, ideology and 
tribalism-nationalism have been fertile sources of low-level 
conflict, and in principle there would seem to be some 
potential for interstate conflict developing between 
Australia and neigbouring Asian and Pacific states from 
these origins. Australia is a liberal democracy closely 
aligned to the Western bloc and has a developed economy. 
Its colonial experience was that of a European settlement 
and later a colonial power rather than a colony in the 
current sense of the term. Australia's Asian and Pacific 
neighbours have generally adapted inherited democratic forms 
of government to meet their own perceived needs and 
priorities. In comparison with Australia it could be said 
that most of them are rather less concerned with political 
and human rights and rather more concerned with the 
imperatives - and rewards - of nation-building. All of them 
are developing countries and most were former colonies. 
They all share the basic Third World perceptions of 
international society and support Third World claims and 
economic programs. 
/U 
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But if politics, ideology and nationalism have been 
important and occasionally decisive elements in some of the 
low-level interstate conflicts considered above, they have 
not reached 
neighbourhood. 
a comparable 
Indonesia's 
intensity 
campaign of 
in Australia's 
Confrontation 
against Malaysia has been the only interstate conflict at 
any level in Australia's neighbourhood since World War II, 
and, as noted above, it owed much to President Sukarno's 
personality and perceptions and to a unique combination of 
domestic and external political circumstances which seem 
unlikely to recur.r2J The differences in perceptions and 
values between Australia and its neighbouring Asian and 
Pacific states have at times produced tension and 
irritation, but the risk of open conflict has remained low. 
The possible reasons why interstate conflict has been a rare 
occurrence in Australia's region since World War II and has 
also been confined to low-level conflict could be debated at 
length, but from the political perspective there appear to 
be several relevant factors connected with the cultural 
inheritance of the region. 
The indigenous South East Asian cultures in Australia's 
neighbourhood are deeply-entrenched, resilient and have 
assimilated a variety of foreign cultures and values. Malay 
culture, 
Islam. 
for example, accommodated first Hinduism and l a ter 
The process of assimilation has hitherto tended to 
modify or dilute foreign cultural acquisitions, and the 
impact of revolutionary or messianic ideology and i ts 
potential for inspiring interstate conflict have 
p 
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consequently been blunted. It . lS arguable whether political 
and ideological motivations in interstate conflict can be 
distilled from other motivations, but it could nevertheless 
be argued that to date these motivations have figured less 
prominently . in interstate relations between Australia's 
South East Asian neighbours than in the interstate relations 
of many other former colonies. Further, these countries 
have been pluralist societies for centuries, which may also 
have blunted the chauvinist spur to aggression. Empires and 
fiefdoms ebbed and flowed over the centuries of South East 
Asian history, but for a variety of reasons - which arguably 
included Hindu passivity, climate, the availability of land 
and resources for a relatively comfortable subsistence 
lifestyle and a parsimonious technological endowment - no 
tradition of aggression evolved on a scale comparable to 
Europe or the Middle East. Finally, all the South East 
Asian states concerned contain disparate and at times 
conflicting cultures, and their governments tend to be 
preoccupied with domestic politics, nation-building and 
development rather than external issues and adventures. 
Perhaps the most distinctive features of the indigenous 
Melanesian cultures in Australia's neighbourhood are their 
cultural variety, small populations and lack of resources. 
In general their preoccupation with economic development and 
nation-building seems greater than in South East Asia, and 
interstate conflict directed against Australia is even less 
likely. 
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Will this relatively benign neighbourhood political 
environment endure? Given the pace of social and economic 
change and accompanying population growth rates (see p.42 
above), it would seem unwise to assume that the absorptive 
capacities of these cultures will necessarily continue to 
accommodate the accelerating pace of cha~ge. There is also 
some potential for conflict between neighbouring states. 
For example, the border between Indonesia and Papua New 
Guinea could be a potential source of regional conflict; it 
could also be one which might involve Australia given our 
past and present associations with Papua New Guinea and our 
proximity to both countries. Australia's northern 
approaches would be vulnerable to a campaign of low-level 
harassment by Indonesian forces in the event of hostilities 
in which Australia declared its support for Papua New 
Guinea. This potential source of low-level conflict should 
nevertheless be kept in perspective, and concerns arising 
from geographic proximity and existing military capabilities 
should not obscure the realities of a changed domestic and 
international political environment from the days of 
Indonesia's Confrontation of Malaysia. Low-level conflict 
involving Australia seems most unlikely, but in the event 
that it did occur, it is quite conceivable that the 
prevailing circumstances may not be conducive to restricting 
it to a low-level. 
In general, however, it would seem premature to assume 
that regional tensions will necessarily produce serious 
conflict; that domestic pressures for change will promote 
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political dislocation or trauma: or that the consequences 
of change will necessarily threaten Australian interests. 
Australia's regional strategic environment could in practice 
become considerably less benign without a serious threat of 
interstate conflict developing. The only firm conclusion 
that can be drawn is that, as our strategic environment . 1S 
undergoing a process of rapid change, Australia must 
maintain the capability to monitor and interpret these 
changes. It is quite conceivable that some of these changes 
may be to our advantage. 
Could low-level interstate conflict develop with more 
distant states? It is difficult to visualise circumstances 
in which this might occur. It is highly unlikely that 
Australia could or would give adequate grounds for offence 
(e.g. through external adventures or gross discrimination 
against a minority group within Australia with overseas 
protectors), and any campaign of low-level conflict against 
Australia by a remote state would almost certainly affect 
Australia's neighbours. It seems probable that any campaign 
of this nature would be part of a winer bid for power or 
influence, and would therefore be unlikely to . remain 
low-level conflict. 
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Territorial Disputes 
Territorial and resources claims are a fertile source 
of low-level interstate conflict, but, as the examples 
reviewed above indicate, these conflicts generally involved 
a history of conflict or enmity and/or a significant 
political/ideological quotient. They also tend to occur 
or near neighbours.r31 between contiguous neighbours 
Australia has no contiguous neighbours and no territorial or 
resources disputes with other states. 
Australia has negotiated maritime boundaries with Papua 
New Guinea and France, which cover the Torres Strait and the 
Kerguelan Islands and New Caledonia. In 1971-72 Australia 
concluded a seabed boundary agreement with Indonesia 
extending from the Arafura Sea to an area south of West 
Timer, leaving a gap opposite then Portuguese Timor. The 
delimitation of the Timer gap and the western seabed 
boundary between Christmas Island and Java have not yet been 
negotiated, and Indonesia has indicated that it wants a more 
generous delimitation than in the earlier negotiations. In 
brief, Indonesia claims that there . lS a single continental 
shelf between the two countries and that a seabed boundary 
based on a median line is appropriate, while the Australian 
view is that there are two continental shelves with the 
Australian shelf extending to the Timer Trough immediately 
south of Timer. Indonesia . views the Timer Trough as an 
accidental depression in the common continental shelf, and 
in a compromise solution in the 1971-72 negotiations the 
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boundary was placed south of the trough's axis but still 
conceded more than 70 per cent of the seabed to Australia. 
A subsequent fisheries surveillance boundary settled on an 
agreed line much closer to the Indonesian median line than 
the Australian continental shelf line. 
The ·seabed boundary delimitation between Australia and 
Indonesia is important to both countries given the potential 
resources at stake, which include oil and natural gas 
fields. But competing negotiating goals do not necessarily 
produce disputes - or conflict. The negotiations may become 
sensitive and obviously contain some conflict potential, but 
there has been no indication that they might lead to any 
level of physical conflict. There are numerous competing 
claims in different parts of the world over maritime 
resources, but, unlike disputed territorial claims, very few 
have ended in open conflict. The armed forces of competing 
states have occupied otherwise uninhabited islands in the 
South China Sea in support of claims to them and to the 
appurtenant maritime zones, but even there open conflict has 
been minimal. Moreover, there are established precedents 
for resolving competing claims of this nature, for example 
through the establishment of a joint development zone. 
Australia's as yet unresolved seabed delimitation with 
Indonesia could conceivably be exploited as a source of 
conflict should a wider political confrontation develop, but 
the delimitation negotiations themselves need not become a 
source of conflict. At present there is no evidence or 
indication that this might occur. 
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Australia has not yet negotiated its maritime 
boundaries with the Solomon Islands and New Zealand. Both 
boundaries are relatively short and seem unlikely to pose 
difficulties. 
Antarctica 
Australia's claim of sovereignty over nearly half of 
Antarctica (some 14 million square kilometres) is being 
challenged in company with the other Antarctic Treaty 
partners with equivalent claims. The challenge is being 
mounted in the United Nations by a number of Third World 
countries led by Malaysia who propose to apply the 'common 
heritage of mankind' concept developed in the Law of the Sea 
conference to Antarctica. Under this regime Antarctica 
would become an international trust territory administered 
by the United Nations or an international body established 
for this purpose and no claims of national sovereignty over 
the territory or its resources would be recognised. The 
nature and value of mineral resources in Antarctica are 
difficult to assess, but they include relatively low grade 
iron ore and coal. The problems of extracting minerals . in 
the Antarctic environment makes exploitation uneconomic at 
least for the immediate future, but food resources in the 
adjacent seas are abundant and could in principle be 
exploited using available technology.r4J 
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Australia has a long association with exploration and 
scientific activity in Antarctica, but it does not have any 
obvious vital national interests at stake in maintaining 
Australian sovereignty. Australia has acquired interests in 
and expertise about Antarctica and has a strong claim for 
participation in the establishment and management of any 
alternative Antarctic regime, but neither the strategic nor 
the resources potential of the frozen continent appear 
likely to jeopardise any vital· Australian interests should 
sovereignty be transferred to a responsible and effective 
international authority. The present Antarctic Treaty 
provides that 'Antarctica shall be used for peaceful 
·purposes only 1 ~rs 1 it is unlikely that an international 
regime controlling Antarctica could do otherwise. 
event the Antarctic environment would pose 
In any 
immense 
difficulties for any attempts to station and operate 
military forces on a scale which might threaten Australian 
security. The few nations with these capabilities could 
threaten Australia more economically and effectively from 
more accessible bases. And Australia's abundance of natural 
resources would seem to pre-empt any prospect of dependence 
upon Antarctic food or mineral resources in the foreseeable 
future. 
Resources Disputes 
Resources claims and disputes do not figure prominently 
in the interstate conflicts examined above. The conflict 
between Argentina and Chile over the Beagle Channel 
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delimitation . lS an incipient one, and in any event Chile's 
claims in the South Atlantic are opposed by Argentina on 
political as much as resources grounds. Britain's 'cod 
wars' with Iceland were more firmly based on a resources 
dispute, but the origins of this conflict stretch to the 
fifteenth century and the conflict quickly acquired domestic 
and international political aspects for both countries (see 
p.22 above). 
It is thus difficult to contrive circumstances in which 
Australia might become involved in low-level i nterstate 
conflict arising largely from claims or disputes about 
resources. As Peter Hastings and Andrew Farran have 
observed, Australia has no resources analogous to Middle 
East oil which are vital global commodities and which could 
seriously affect world markets (and possibly provoke 
conflict) if withheld.r6! World food production is keeping 
pace with population growth and the general global food 
outlook appears promising in all regions except South Asia 
and the Sahel region in Africa.r7J Any 'conflict' involving 
Australia over resources issues seems likely to be con f ined 
to competition to maintain and expand Australia's overseas 
markets against increasing international competition. The 
only resource that Australia might withhold from world 
markets is uranium, which is readily available elsewhere and 
which appears to have a problematic future as an economic 
source of electric power generation. 
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Australia's domestic market for imports . lS an 
artificial rather than a natural resource, but some 
observers predict that the pressures from neighbouring 
countries to admit their exports will increase and may 
adversely affect Australia's political relations with 
them.~8~ Terms of trade have not figured as a source of 
low-level conflict in any of the examples of interstate 
conflict examined above: could they become a source of such 
conflict between Australia and its neighbours? 
In the late 1970s Australia was subjected to trenchant 
criticism by the then five ASEAN countries - Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand - for its 
protectionist trade policies. This criticism intensified in 
1978-79 when Singapore led an ASEAN attack on Australia's 
new International Civil Aviation Policy as another 
manifestation of protectionism. Although retaliatory action 
was threatened, in practice none of the governments 
concerned embarked on this course directly and a brief 
boycott of Australian products by Singapore trade unions had 
no significant impact on Australian trade. 
Criticism of Australian protectionism and demands for 
improved access to the Australian market in ASEAN councils 
subsequently abated, although the issue remains one of 
continuing co~cern to the ASEAN countries. The main factors 
in the moderation of the ASEAN position appear to have been 
recognition that the size of the Australian market is such 
that even a laissez faire trade policy would make relatively 
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little difference to ASEAN exporters, and that in any event 
Australia is not the only - nor necessarily the worst 
offender in protecting its domestic industries. The ASEAN 
countries also appear to have acquired a greater 
appreciation of the domestic economic, social and political 
consequences in Australia of a flood of ASEAN imports. 
The suggestion that any of Australia's trading partners 
might threaten or resort to low-level interstate violence to 
force exports on the unwilling Australian consumer . lS 
bizarre, although complaints about Australian protectionism 
could conceivably figure in a wider list of complaints which 
taken together might lead to low-level conflict. But the 
relatively small size of the potential Australian market and 
Australia's potential importance as a source of raw 
materials and foodstuffs make it extremely unlikely that 
differences over terms of trade alone could escalate into 
low-level conflict. Problems of lesser magnitudes might 
arise if Australia were to withhold its exports of 
foodstuffs and raw materials, but once again it is difficult 
to contrive a situation in which it would serve Australian 
interests to do so. The ASEAN countries can be expected to 
press hard for the best terms of trade they can extract from 
Australia, but it is a very long step from contesting terms 
of trade by conventional means to pursuing such claims by 
resort to low-level conflict. 
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Capabilities 
The present absence of potential sources of or 
motivation for low-level interstate conflict posit a 
relatively benign regional strategic environment, but one 
should not overlook the fact that all regional states 
(including Australia) possess varying capabilities to 
initiate such conflict against each other (see Annex A). In 
addition, Australia's relatively remote, sparsely-populated 
and resource-rich northern approaches appear peculiarly 
vulnerable to many low-level contingencies (raids, 
harassment, temporary lodgements etc.). The resources 
required to pursue low-level conflict strategies are 
obviously less than those required for high-level conflict 
and can in principle be met from forces-in-being at short 
notice. Thus should the strategic policies, motives or 
objectives of a regional state change, it would already 
possess the option to pursue low-level conflict strategies. 
These capabilities alone impose an obligation on Australian 
defence planners to take due account of the implications of 
low-level conflict contingencies for Australia's security. 
Internal Conflict and Australia 
It seems inconceivable that the seeds of the internal 
conflicts (p.23) could take root . in examined above 
contemporary Australian political, economic or social soil. 
The conflicts all attracted varying and usually significant 
degrees of external intervention, but in every case the 
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conflict had domestic origins and the instigators were 
indigenous, although their objectives, rhetoric and tactics 
were often influenced by or imported from foreign sources. 
Australia simply lacks the basic ing~edients for conflicts 
of this nature: it . lS culturally homogeneous, has a 
responsive and generally equitable structure of government, 
its citizens enjoy a relatively high and broadly even 
standard of living, and Australian society has demonstrated 
a capacity to respond and adapt to economic and social 
change. It is not an environment conducive to l ow-level 
internal conflict. 
Nevertheless the strategies and tactics of internal 
conflict like those of colonial conflict - could yield 
useful lessons for planning the defence of Australia. An 
understanding of the origins and nature of internal 
low-level conflict could also assist our understanding of 
our regional strategic environment, which includes a number 
of states with some experience of and potential for internal 
conflict. Australia need not - and arguably should not -
seek any interventionist role should serious internal 
conflict occur in neighbouring states, but it must be 
recognised that such conflict could have important 
implications for Australia's security - not least through 
the refugee exodus and external intervention that this 
of conflict can precipitate. 
form 
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Conclusion 
The record of low-level conflict contingencies examined 
above contains some insights and lessons for Australian 
. defence policy, but the experience of such conflict since 
World War II seems to have little direct application to 
Australia's strategic environment. The tactics employed by 
an initiator/aggressor can be visualised in the Australian 
context, but none of the varied origins of the conflicts 
reviewed above, nor the objectives of the opposing groups, 
translate as easily. In brief, it would seem that if 
politics have to date been a fundamental element of 
low-level conflict, this element is conspicuously lacking 
Australia's contemporary strategic environment. 
. in 
The lessons for Australia that can be distilled from 
past experience of low-level conflict appear reassuring in 
Australia's current strategic environment, but it should not 
be assumed that the future will resemble the past. The 
evolution of conflict this century indicates that it would 
be . unwise to assume that future variants will conform to 
past patterns. Demands on limited or scarce resources 
arising from rapid population growth could precipitate many 
levels of conflict, and the evolution of ideologies could 
alter Australia's strategic environment by introducing the 
political demands and pressures which are currently absent 
but which seem a prerequisite for low-level conflict. A 
revolutionary or messianic religious upheaval or the 
translation of the 'common heritage of mankind' concept into 
63 
specific demands on Australia and its resources could also 
transform Australia's strategic environment in a relatively 
short period of time. 
Technological change may also make low-level conflict a 
more feasible, effective or attractive proposition. The 
stakes in high-level conventional conflict may, like nuclear 
conflict, become too great to risk except in situations 
involving national survival. Developments 
political 
in weapons 
technology may enhance the and military 
effectiveness and potential rewards of low-level conflict. 
Another assumption about low-level conflict that should 
be qualified is that it need not necessarily remain 
low-level. The examples of low-level conflict reviewed 
above by definition remained thus, but it must be borne in 
mind that high-level conflict can begin at a low-level and 
escalate through the continuum between them. Possible 
constraints on escalation may not be present or immediately 
apparent, and assumptions about the intrinsic nature of 
low-level conflict could prove disastrously wrong if such 
conflict was in fact the beginning of high-level conflict. 
The lessons of history can be instructive, but they are not 
immutable. 
I· 
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Statistical Study of War-,- University of California 
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B: LOW-LEVEL CONTINGENCIES AND AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE POLICY 
V. THE EVOLUTION OF AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE POLICY 
Introductfon 
Australia's contemporary defence policy is the product 
of . a unique, consistent and relatively long evolutionary 
process. This inheritance appears to exert a powerful 
influence on contemporary perceptions of Australia's 
strategic and defence policy options. The most enduring 
feature of Australian defence and foreign policy has been 
the degree of dependence on a protector sought and 
maintained by successive generations of Australian leaders. 
One commentator dubbed loyalty to a protector 'the central 
idea of Australian policy' and added the pertinent 
observation that 
Most nations forced by circumstances to depend on 
a protector try to maximise their independence. 
Australia's peculiarity is that it has tried to 
maximise its dependence.r11 
This policy of dependence on a protector was arguably 
consistent with Australia's interests and strategic 
environment from the time of European settlement until 1945. 
It was a logical and generally effective response given 
Australia's strategic situation and defence resources, the 
availability of acceptable protectors, and the course of 
Australia's colonial and post-colonial development. The 
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continued cultivation of this level of dependence during the 
1950s and 1960s seems less soundly based, but nevertheless 
consistent with past experience and the prevailing 
perceptions of Australia's security interests. The 
enunciation of the Nixon Doctrine in 1969 and 1970 and the 
accompanying withdrawal of United States forces from 
mainland South East Asia weakened the keystone of the policy 
of dependence - the availability of an acceptable protector 
and precipitated a policy reappraisal which is still in 
progress. The 1976 White Paper on Australian Defence 
acknowledged that increased self-reliance had become a 
primary requirement,r2~ but so far this assessment has not 
been translated into either defence doctrine or 
capabilities. 
Criteria for Protectors 
A defence policy of dependence on a protector is only 
feasible if the protector is available, willing and 
apparently capable of providing the required level of 
protection on acceptable terms, and is thus recognised by 
potential enemies. The relationship between the protected 
and the protecting powers implies at the very least an 
agreed basis of mutual or complementary interests to be 
protected and effective communication between them. The 
dependability and durability of the relationship would be 
affected by the participants' compatibility in terms of 
culture and values, which would affect their communication 
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and their perceptions of their respective interests. 
Interests, perceptions and capabilities could all be 
expected to alter over time, and both parties would need to 
maintain a capacity to monitor and respond to these changes. 
Colonial Australia 
The Australian colonies had no formal responsibilities 
for foreign or defence policy until federation in 1901, but 
from the time of European settlement the colonists 
manifested a marked concern about defence and security 
matters. These included the perceived need to forestall 
other European settlement on the Australian continent and 
adjacent Pacific Islands: concern to resist Asian and 
Pacific migration to Australia: and the need to develop an 
indigenous defence capacity to supplement local British 
forces as European powers and later Japan became interested 
.,. 
in the south-west Pacific.~3] The colonists' recurring fears 
about external threats or interference were compounded by 
their consciousness of remoteness from their protector and 
by their meagre and scattered numbers. Both considerations 
continue to affect perceptions in contemporary Australian 
defence debates. 
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Britain as Protector 
The unique relationship between the Australian colonies 
and Britain was a central element in Australia's colonial 
and early post-colonial development. The course of European 
power politics, the pre-eminence of the Royal Navy and the 
more immediate attractions of the United States of America 
for European emigrants combined to produce a relatively 
homogeneous settler population which remained securely 
within Britain's orbit. White settlement was not contested 
by any large or organised indigenous population and the 
Australian colonists were not subsequently forced to adapt 
to the existence of a substantial indigenous society. 
European settlement in Australia thus retained a marked 
British identity for most of the nineteenth century - not 
least because it was spared both the diverse cultural 
origins of the American and Canadian immigrants and the 
resistance from an indigenous population encountered by 
European colonists in South Africa. 
The close identification of identity and interests 
between the Australian colonies and Britain provided the 
foundation for the policy of dependency on a protector which 
endures today. Such dependency was natural in the early 
days of settlement, but its persistence after the colonies 
achieved self-government . in the latter half of the 
nineteenth century is exceptional. The assertive 'bush 
nationalism' of the 1890s derided many British institutions 
and values and seemed to assert a unique Australian 
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identity, yet the 'bush proletariat' enthusiastically 
endorsed the bargain struck between their leaders and their 
imperial protector: that Australia would contribute to the 
defence of imperial interests within the limits of its 
resources in return for British undertakings to defend 
Australia. Australians enlisted in substantial numbers to 
serve in imperial wars and campaigns in the Sudan, against 
the Boxer Rebellion in China, in the Boer War and in World 
War I. The only significant opposition in Australia to the 
imperial cause surfaced against conscription proposals . 1.n 
World War I, and sank thereafter. Australia maintained its 
policy of dependence on a protector until in 1941 the 
protector was revealed to be incapable of fulfilling its 
side of the bargain. Confronted by the threat of invasion 
by a hostile major power - and comforted by the availability 
of an alternative protector Australia responded by 
changing protectors. In the prevailing circumstances it was 
understandable that the utility of the policy itself passed 
apparently unquestioned. 
The United States of America as Protector 
The United States of America fulfilled all the criteria 
for a protector insofar that in 1941 it was a substantial 
and compatible Pacific power that was available, willing and 
capable of providing the level of protection Australia 
needed. It formally assumed the mantle of protector with 
the ANZUS Treaty of 1951, and Australia upheld its side of 
I· 
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the bargain. Australian forces served alongside United 
States forces in Korea and Vietnam: Australian forces also 
served with Commonwealth formations in Malaya (and later 
Malaysia) in campaigns which the United States supported 
short of direct military intervention. 
The nature of Australia's dependency on the United 
States was qualitatively different from its former 
dependency on Britain. It is unlikely that Australia's 
close identification with British interests and acquiescence 
to British leadership in foreign and defence policy would 
have survived the war even if Britain had been able to offer 
credible protection against a Japanese assault. The impact 
of the war on Australian and British interests, perceptions 
and societies seems likely to have altered the nature of 
their special relationship regardless of the level of 
Britain's residual influence in Asia and the Pacific. In 
the immediate post-war years the Australian Labor Party 
discarded its 
distinctively 
pre-war 
Australian 
isolationism and pursued a 
foreign policy. Successive 
Australian governments sought to develop an indigenous 
capacity to analyse and assess Australia's strategic 
environment and external interests to enable them to weigh 
the potential risks and returns of their defence and foreign 
policy options. Australia's level of military dependence on 
United States protection was arguably comparable to its 
former dependence on Britain, but the Australian governments 
of the period did not seek to transfer Australia's former 
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dependence on Whitehall for policy, 
intelligence to Washington. 
representation and 
The United States remains capable of 
Australia . in virtually all conceivable 
protecting 
strategic 
circurnsta~ces, but the Vietnam debacle, the 'Nixon Doctrine' 
and the preoccupations and constraints of superpower status 
have raised some reservations and doubts about its 
availability and willingness. The implications for 
Australian defence doctrine of this somewhat uncertain and 
qualified dependency on a protector have now been debated 
for over a decade without substantive results, 
debate seems set to continue. 
The Inheritance 
and the 
The course of the evolution of Australian defence 
policy has produced a strong tradition of dependency on a 
protector based on Australia's willingness to contribute to 
the defence of the protector's overseas interests in return 
for guarantees that the protector will defend Australia 
against external aggression. Australia upheld its side of 
the bargain in wars and campaigns ranging in time and place 
from the Sudan to Vietnam, and its force structure evolved 
accordingly. 
compatibility 
Australia's forces evolved on the . premise of 
with the protector's counterparts and a 
related reliance on the protector's support facilities. The 
consequences of this dependence include a marked lack of 
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experience in joint operations between elements of the 
Australian defence forces, a concern to maintain 'state of 
the art' capabilities equivalent to those maintained by the 
protector, and a consequent orientation towards doctrine and 
equipment developed and designed for foreign strategic and 
physical ·environments. This inheritance has inevitabl y 
influenced Australian perceptions of low-level conflict 
contingencies and their relevance to Australian defence 
policy. 
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NOTES 
1. Bruce Grant, The Crisis of Loyalty, Angus and 
Robertson, Sydney, 1972, p.1-.-
2. Australian Parliament, Australian Defence (White Paper 
pres~nted to Parliament by the Minister for Defence, 
the Hon. D.J. Killen, November 1976), Australian 
Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1976, p.10. 
3. For example, see T.B. Millar, Australia in Peace and 
War, Australian National University Press, Canberra, 
1918, pp.55-57 and 90-94. 
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VI. LOW-LEVEL CONFLICT CONTINGENCIES AND 
AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE POLICY 
This .section . examines the role and perceptions of 
low-level conflict contingencies in contemporary Australian 
defence policy. 
Present Historical 
The tradition of dependency on a protector remains 
entrenched notwithstanding official acknowledgement of the 
importance of increased self-reliance. The 1976 White Paper 
on Australian Defence described increased self-reliance as 
'a primary requirement', but qualified this finding with the 
comforting observation that 
Our alliance with the US gives substantial grounds 
for confidence that in the event of a fundamental 
threat to Australia's security, US military 
support would be forthcoming.rl} 
In November 1983 the Minister for Defence, Mr Gordon 
Scholes, alluded to his participation in a 'major review of 
the ANZUS Treaty' in the following terms: 
Despite changes that have taken place in the world 
since the treaty was signed, we concluded that the 
basic interests of the three parties still 
coincided. At the same time it was recognised 
that each party needed to provide for its own 
security, as far as its resources would allow.r2} 
This statement reaffirmed both the bargain between Australia 
and its protector enunciated in the ANZUS Treaty and the 
limits of self-reliance. 
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But contemporary Australian defence policy . 1S not 
entirely the product of a unique historical experience: its 
inertia also owes much to the absence of a defined or 
definable security threat. In the words of the then 
Minister for Defence, Mr D."J. Killen, . 1n a written 
statement to the JCFAD Sub-Committee on Defence Matters in 
March 1981, 'there is no tangible identifiable threat' .r3, 
Unlike their NATO counterparts, Australia's defence planners 
do not have a clearly defined threat with an attendant order 
of battle and strategic and tactical doctrine to counter. 
In recent years Australian defence planners have adopted a 
' core force' approach, defined in March 1981 by the then 
Chief of Defence Force Staff {Admiral Synnot) to the JCFAD 
Sub-Committee on Defence Matters in the following terms: 
At present, without one specific threat to meet, 
we have a core force which has a basis for 
expansion in a number of different directions ... 
The core force is not static because the threats 
are changing all the time ... It should be 
capable of meeting any likely short term, 
low-level contingencies because those are the ones 
that could come without warning.r41 
Thus in the absence of both overseas commitments in support 
of the protector and a defined threat to Australia's 
security, the force-in-being has been rationalised as an 
expansion base . 1n part designed to meet low-level 
contingencies.rs~ What low-level contingencies are 
canvassed, and what impact has the approach had on defence 
doctrine and defence force structure? 
) 
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Objectives vs Tactics 
A striking feature of the Australian debate about 
low-level conflict contingencies is a tendency to focus on 
tactics or hostile actions without confronting the origins, 
political . context, objectives or strategies instructing 
them. Admiral Synnot described low-level contingencies . in 
terms of their form: raids or terrorist acts on mainland 
Australia or on offshore oil rigs.r6~ He did not speculate 
on their inspiration or objectives. Other informed 
observers have acknowledged the political aspects of 
low-level contingencies, but few have developed them into 
realistic scenarios. Commodore Gray, for example, 
speculated that low-level contingencies 
could occur where the aggressor wished to apply 
military pressures, or pressures requiring a 
military response to achieve political objectives 
which he ha-s been unable to achieve through other 
means. r7: 
Gray identified a number of pertinent factors that would 
determine the nature and extent of such conflict and listed 
a range of tactics that might be used, but he did not 
speculate upon the possible origins of conflict or the 
aggressor's objectives. 
Perhaps the most detailed attempt to explore the 
possible motives or objectives of an initiator/aggressor of 
low-level conflict against Australia is contained in the 
JCFAD report Threats to Australia's Security. The Committee 
acknowledged that the motives for such action were 
hypothetical and difficult to visualise, but suggested that 
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could develop for several possible reasons: 
(a) to weaken Australia's commitment to the Western 
Alliance in a period of superpower tension: 
(b) to achieve short-term or long-term political or 
economic objectives (e.g. control of Australian 
territory to gain access to onshore or offshore 
resources, to establish bases on - or maritime 
claims from - island territories): 
(c) to gain direct control of the resources of an 
under-utilised or less-populated part of Australia 
(e.g. 
within 
in the event of great internal disorder 
Australia or Australia's inability to 
supply foreign markets with important resources): 
(d) to exploit serious ideological or other divisions 
in Australia should they occur: 
(e) to pressure or punish Australia through acts of 
terrorism in support of political objectives or 
dissident or minority groups within Australia.rs ~ 
None of these motives or objectives seem plausible . in 
Australia's present circumstances. It is difficult to 
envisage how low-level threats could weaken Australia's 
commitment to the Western Alliance: given Australia ' s 
history of dependency, such action would probably strengthen 
this commitment. In the unlikely event that Australia was a 
focus of superpower tension, it would probably be a 
contingency in which the protector's assistance cou ld b e 
guaranteed: it would also seem prone to escalation above 
low-level conflict. But as Australia's strategic importance 
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to either superpower is not particularly great and would be 
eclipsed by that of a number of other states, Australia 
seems a very unlikely target for 
confrontation. In short, the 
this form of superpower 
possible benefits of this 
strategy would seem elusive and far outweighed by the 
attendant risks. 
With regard to JCFAD scenario (b), we have seen that 
Australia has no territorial or resources disputes and at 
present the remaining maritime border delimitations seem 
unlikely to yield any. If a hostile state sought control of 
/· Australian territory or resources its claim would most 
probably be based on force of arms alone, and if pursued, 
such conflict seems unlikely to remain low-level for long. 
The prospect of 'great internal disorder' within Australia 
(JCFAD scenarios (c) and (d)) also seems extremely remote, 
and Australia contains no vital resources that cannot be 
obtained from other suppliers. The absence of exploitable 
internal divisions or externally defensible claims against 
Australia's resources greatly diminishes the potential value 
of the tactics of low-level conflict in support of them. 
By a process or elimination one could conclude that 
acts of terrorism in pursuit of political objectives (JCFAD 
scenario (e)) seem the most plausible threat, although 
Australia's homogeneous and basically egalitarian society 
would be rather less susceptible to this affliction than 
many others. At this time it seems most unlikely that any 
neighbouring states would support such acts, and it would be 
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difficult for more remote states to tender support on any 
significant scale. It is difficult to foresee acts of 
terrorism in Australia reaching a level which might require 
extensive or continuing support of the civil power by the 
defence forces. 
The most elaborate low-level conflict scenario to date 
was that devised for Exercise Kangaroo 83. The basis for 
the campaign of low-level conflict mounted in north-west 
Australia by the mythical state of Kamaria is instructive: 
Australia's refusal to issue fishing licences and a sudden 
price rise for Australian bauxite imported by Kamaria's 
alumina plants. The scenario presupposed that Kamaria had a 
developed fishing industry with established fishing rights 
in Australian waters, and that it had no alternative bauxite 
suppliers. 
Australia. 
Neither contingency is in fact applicable to 
The British-Icelandic 'cod wars' suggest that 
fishing disputes with the right mix of history, economics 
and politics can lead to low-level conflict, but 
notwithstanding current and past tensions involving Persian 
Gulf states, there do not appear to have been any outbreaks 
of low-level conflict arising from a refusal to supply a 
particular resource. The Kangaroo 83 exercise scenario 
provided a structure for a useful and imaginative defence 
exercise, but neither source of provocation for conflict 
seems directly applicable to contemporary Australia. 
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Defence Doctrine and Force Structure 
Defence doctrine and force structure are notoriously 
resistant to change, the inertia of the latter being partly 
a consequence of the lifetime of major weapons systems. 
This iner.tia . lS particularly marked in Australian defence 
doctrine and force structure which evolved on the premise of 
dependence on a protector; have hitherto been oriente<l 
towards overseas service supplementing the protector's 
forces; and have only recently begun to address the 
strategic and tactical problems of the defence of Australia 
and the implications of a policy of increased self-reliance. 
One consequence of this inertia has been a tendency to 
favour weapons ·systems replacements incorporating 'state of 
the art' capabilities developed by Australia's protector and 
other allies for very different strategic environments. The 
initial specifications for the replacement tactical fighter 
favoured air superiority, which has little obvious 
application to the defence of Australia. As Andrew Farran 
has pointed out, its advocates presuppose 'a 
Battle-of-Britain situation•r9} which . lS at best highly 
improbable. In the event the F/A-18 Hornet was selected in 
part because of its maritime interdiction capabilities, 
which signified a welcome advance towards a weapons systems 
replacement doctrine more oriented to the defence of 
Australia. 
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But the fixation on 'state of the art' equipment 
replacement which places undue emphasis on the capabilities 
of allies at the expense of Australia's defence environment 
remains entrenched. The Army continues to accept the 
utility of operating tanks in the defence of Australia, and 
the Royal Australian Navy almost succeeded in its campaign 
to replace the aircraft carrier 'Melbourne'. The Navy was 
ultimately defeated more on grounds of cost rather than 
doctrine. 
In fairness to Australia's military planners one must 
acknowledge that the absence of a defined threat to 
. 
Australia's security facilitates this doctrinal and 
structural inertia. Admiral Synnot made a spirited defence 
' 
of current defence doctrine and force structure to the JCFAD 
in March 1981 in response to reported criticism of the 'core 
force' concept by Drs O'Neill and Ball of the ANU Strategic 
and Defence Studies Centre: 
If Dr Ball can tell us that the terminal force has 
to meet a certain threat, that it is the only 
threat we are likely to get and it will be in 25 
years, our job would be easy. But nobody in the 
world can say what the threat will be in 25 years. 
We think it would be irresponsible to have a force 
in being ... which is tailored narrowly to meet 
that one terminal threat, because we could get it 
wrong... So we believe that, until we can 
estimate with confidence what that terminal threat 
is to be, we must keep our options open~ 
otherwise we are not being responsible.r101 
The absence of a 'terminal threat' clearly inhibits 
Australian defence planning, and the dynamic nature of 
Australia's regional strategic environment suggests that 
Admiral Synnot's advocacy of a flexible force structure 
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which could be adapted to meet a variety of needs is well 
based. But these considerations need not inhibit the 
development of defence doctrine set firmly within 
Australia's strategic environment and which draws very 
selectively on those elements of the doctrine and 
capabilities of Australia's allies that are applicable to 
this environment. The adoption of a low-level conflict 
scenario for Kangaroo 83 suggests that defence doctrine may 
be shifting course in this direction, albeit to date with 
little impact on force structure. Kangaroo 83 employed an 
artificial low-level conflict contingency . scenario to 
exercise the existing force structure and explore some of 
the implications of civil-military cooperation in · the 
defence of remote areas in northern Australia. Nevertheless 
its focus on the defence of Australia and combined 
operations between the Australian services could prove to be 
a significant point of divergence in the slow evolution of a 
truly Australian defence policy. 
Future Perfect? 
The experience of low-level conflict since World War II 
suggests at least five general conclusions about the nature 
of low-level conflict and its relevance to Australia. 
First, it seems neither easy nor advantageous to attempt to 
classify conflict into discrete levels or categories; 
conflict categories based on the defence capabilities of a 
single state appear particularly artificial. 
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Secondly, a fundamental characteristic of low-level 
conflict to date has been its substantial political 
quotient, which should not be obscured by the strategies or 
tactics employed in such conflicts. 
Thir~ly, while Australia's present strategic situation 
does not correspond with any of the low-level conflict 
profiles reviewed above, this does not necessarily confer 
immunity. The very variable and political nature of 
low-level conflict, the relatively limited resources 
required to initiate it, and the dynamic nature of 
Australia's regional strategic environment all suggest that 
Australia cannot afford to neglect such contingencies. 
Fourthly, the historical record suggests that it would 
be unwise to assume that future low-level conflicts will 
conform to established patterns. Interstate conflict has 
undergone many transformations this century, and low-level 
conflict has taken many forms since World War II. It can be 
assumed that such change will continue, and that political 
and technological change - and conceivably global strategic 
changes could affect the nature of low-level conflict, 
Australia's strategic environment, and the potential for 
low-level conflict within it. Australia's unique geograph y 
and demography (notably its size, relative isolation and 
resource and population distribution) would seem to render 
it potentially more vulnerable to many low-level conflict 
strategies than most of its geographically smaller or more 
closely-settled allies. The deliberate introduction of 
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exotic diseases amongst Australian livestock, for example, 
could be a devastating and relatively easily accomplished 
low-level conflict strategy which would exploit some of 
Australia's unique vulnerabilities. It would also mark a 
new departure for low-level conflict and would in part 
reflect advances in technology which make this capability 
more accessible than before.(11] 
Finally, it cannot be assumed that low-level conflict 
will necessarily remain thus. The examples reviewed above 
were by definition those with effective inhibitions on 
escalation to higher levels of conflict. The record of 
interstate conflict as a whole since World War II contains 
numerous examples in which low-level conflict was a prelude 
for or a step towards high-level conflict. Any assessments 
of low-level conflicts or low-level conflict contingencies 
obviously need to take account of the inhibitions (or 
potential inhibitions) to escalation arising from the 
adversaries' respective capabilities or from relevant 
political or strategic factors. It cannot be assumed that 
such inhibitions will necessarily be present or, if 
initially present, that they will be unaffected by the 
course of the conflict. 
Against this background, the implications of low-level 
conflict contingencies for Australian defence policy can be 
divided into four main elements. First, Australia needs to 
maintain a capability to monitor and analyse external 
political, economic, military and other developments which 
J 
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might contain the potential for generating low-level 
conflicts involving Australia. This capability would 
obviously also cover higher levels of potential conflict, 
but a primary requirement at the lower end of the conflict 
spectrum would be a capacity to underst~nd and interpret the 
often complex political elements which appear 
recurring constituents of such conflicts. 
to be 
Secondly, Australia should maintain a capability to 
respond promptly and effectively to counter those low-level 
conflict contingencies assessed likely to . arise or which 
could arise at very short notice. As minimal resources are 
required to initiate a campaign of low-level conflict, an 
aggressor can generally initiate a campaign of this nature 
at very short notice using existing forces and equipment. 
It appears probable that any low-level conflict involving 
Australia would be of external rather than internal origin, 
and would therefore involve some form of sovereignty 
infringement. An effective Australian response would 
require surveillance and mobility capabilities of a 
reasonably high order, which would in turn require close 
cooperation between elements of the Australian armed 
services and between the armed services and civilian 
authorities along the lines explored in the scenario for 
Exercise Kangaroo 83. The capability to respond to a 
campaign of externally-directed low-level conflict would 
also imply a flexible strike capacity affording a selection 
of responses against the aggressor and/or against the 
regional bases and resources supporting the campaign. The 
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mix of desirable retaliatory capabilities could be debated 
at length, but at the very least it should encompass 
sufficient flexibility to avoid a choice between escalation 
or defeat. 
Thir~ly, the experience of low-level conflict since 
World War II suggests some potent defence strategies which 
in the Australian context would probably amount to 
strategies of last resort against an invading or occupying 
force. The ultimate effectiveness of such strategies would 
depend on many variables, but the capability itself could 
raise the deterrence threshold significantly. 
Finally, the limits of the implications of low-level 
conflict contingencies for Australian defence policy should 
be recognised. At present low-level conflict contingencies 
seem no more threatening to Australia's interests or 
security than their higher level counterparts. In 
Australia's current and foreseeable strategic situation it 
seems sensible to assume that any conflict contingency could 
contain the seeds of escalation, and to maintain a 
capability to identify and respond selectively to a broad 
spectrum of conflict contingencies. 
It could also be argued that the debate about low-level 
conflict contingencies has a role in the slow evolution of 
an Australian defence policy. Their invocation has focussed 
the debate more sharply on . issues associated with the 
defence of Australia, and might in time contribute to 
changes in Australian defence attitudes and perceptions 
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which in their essentials are remarkably compatible with 
those of the early European colonists. 
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1. Australian Parliament, Australian Defence (White Paper 
presented to Parliament by the Minister for Defence, 
the Hon. D.J. Killen, November 1976), Australian 
Gover_nment Publishing Service, Canberra, 1976, p.10. 
2. Gordon Scholes, 'Self Reliance in the Defence of 
Australia' (Address by the Minister of Defence to the 
Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian 
National University, 28 November 1983), p.4. 
3. Incorporated into the Hansard record of the Joint 
Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, 18 March 
1981, p.1643. 
4. Hansard, ibid, p.1680-1681. 
5. The rationale for the 'core force' was also enunciated 
in the Minister for Defence's written statement to the 
Committee (Hansard, ibid, p.1642). 
6. Hansard, ibid, p.1689. 
7. K.D. Gray, 'Some Defence Concepts for Australia', 
Journal of the Royal United Services Institute of 
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pp.44-45, 48. 
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11. See Paper by J.H. Johnston, 'Exotic Animal Disease 
Emergencies in the Australian Grazing Sector : An 
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Annex A 
A STATISTICAL PROFILE OF AUSTRALIA'S REGIONAL STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT 
Australia N.Z. A S E A N C O U N T R I E S I N D O C H I N A C O U N T R I E S Papua New Guinea 
Brunei Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand Cambodia Laos Vietnam 
Area 
'000 sq km 7,682 269 5.8 1,919 330 797 0.6 513 181 264 333 462 
Po12ulation 
Size (millions) 1982 15.0 3.1 0.2 151.3 14.7 51.6 2.5 49.8 6.5 3.7 56.6 3.3 
\ av. annual growth 
1976-82 0.8 0.9 2.4 l. 7 2.4 2.6 1.2 2.1 5.0 2.4 2.8 2.8 
Rural/Urban\ 1980 11.2/88. 8 15.2/84.8 na 79.8/20.2 70.6/29.4 63.8/36.2 25.9/74.l 85.6/14.4 86.1/13.9 86.6/13.4 80.2/19.8 72.0/28.0 
Projected year 2000 
(millions) 17.8 4.0 na 198.7 21. 3 77 .o 2.9 68.6 10.6 5.7 78.9 5.2 
Rural/Urban\ projected 
year 2000 7.4/92.6 10.4/89.6 na 67.7/32.3 58.4/41.6 51.0/49.0 21.5/78.5 76.8/23.2 76.3/23.7 74.9/25.l 69.8/30.2 42.2/57..8 
Projected year 2020 
(millions) 19.6 4.6 na 238.4 27.5 102.5 3.2 86.4 13.4 7.8 100.8 7.4 
Rural/Urban\ projected 
year 2020 5.3/94.7 7.4/92.6 na 51.9/48.l 43.2/56.8 36.9/63.l 15.2/84.8 61.7/38.3 61.1/38 .9 59.4/40.6 53.9/46.l 30.0/70.0 
Production and Prices 
GNP (US$ billion) 152.6a 17.3 na 84 25.7 10.9 12.4 39.3 na na 9.0 2.la 
Per capita income (US$) 8,658 5,540 na 520 1,797 815 4,071 815 na na 160 800 
\av. GNP growth 1970-80 na 2.9 na 7.5 11.2 6.0 14.8 18.0 na na 2.4 0.2 
Agriculture as\ of GNP 6.8a 10.3 na 26.0 23.4 na na 24.8 na na 45.0 na 
Industry as\ of GNP 20.6a 33.0 na 41.2 20.4 37.5 22.9 27.9 na na 26.0 na 
Defence 
Total Armed Forces 1982 
( '000) 73.2 12.9 3.2 269.0 99.l 112.8 42.0 233.l c.20.0 48.7 1,029.0 3.8 
Estimated expenditure 
1981 (US$m) 4,778 463 c.195 2,692 2,055 862 707 1,306 na na na 38 
\ GNP 1981 3.0 2.2 na 3.3 8.3 2.2 5.7 3.5 na na na 0.8 
\ Public Expenditure 
1981 c.10.0 4.9 na 12.3 19.7 12.7 15.6 19.3 na na na 3.0 
Foreign Trade 
Total foreign trade as 
\ GNP 28.0a 30.3 108.0 37.0 86.2 36.0 289.0 47.0 na na na 55.0 
Merchandise imports 1981 
(US$m) 21,420 4,278 599 9,154 11,760 6,959 27,346 11,887 na na 1,080 842 
Merchandise exports 1981 \..0 
(US$m) 21 ,700 4,889 4,072 21,967 11,432 4,457 10,791 7,991 na na 369 1,018 ....J 
Balance of payments 1981 
(US$m) +l,362 + 652 +3,472 +l,369 
-1,903 - 587 + 910 -3,289 na na - 248 - 46 
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Sources 
Far Eastern Economic Review, Asia 1983 Yearbook 
United Nations, Demographic Indicators of Countries: 
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Estimates and Projections as Assessed in 1980 
International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics 
Yearbook 1982 
Asian Development Bank, Key Indicators of Developing Member 
Countries of ADB, Vol.XIV, April 1983. 
Note: 
a GDP (not GNP) 
